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* Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School. Ithank Professor Peter B. Maggs for his helpful suggestions and my many colleaguesat the George Washington University Law School who gave me valuable commentswhen I presented this article as a work-in-progress. Dean Michael Young providedgenerous assistance.1 Mr. W illiam A. Schnader proposed the idea in 1940 when serving as thePresident of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform States Laws(“N.C.C.U.S.L.”). See William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist Movement300 (1973); 1  James J. White & Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial Code§ 1, at 3 (3d prac. ed. 1988).2 See T wining, supra note 1, at 284 . 3 See id.4 See id . at 271  (concluding that “there is no doubt that Llewellyn was easily themost important single figure” involved in the U.C.C.’s creation); Soia Mentschikoff,Highlights of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 Mod. L. Rev. 167, 168 n.3 (1964)(noting that “[d]espite the numbers of persons involved in the drafting of the Code,the extent to which it reflects Llewellyn’s philosophy of law and his sense ofcommercial wisdom and  need is startling”). 5 See Eugene F. Mooney, Old Kontract Principles and Karl’s New Kode: AnEssay on the Jurisprudence of Our N ew Commercial Law, 11  Vill. L. Rev. 213(1966).6 See Mitchell Franklin, On the Legal Method of the Uniform CommercialCode, 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 330, 330-34 (1951); see also Twining, supra note1, at 271 (identifying similar  appellations). 
71 U. Colo. L. Rev. 541 (2000)KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINTON THE JURISPRUDENCE OFTHE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE Gregory E. Maggs* Introduction The Uniform Commercial Code (“U.C.C.”) at one time indisputablyowed more to Professor Karl N. Llewellyn than to anyone else. AlthoughLlewellyn did not initiate the plan to combine various uniform state lawson business subjects into a coherent code,1  he played a pivotal role intranslating this objective into the U.C.C. Llewellyn led the U.C.C.’sdrafting as the “Chief Reporter” from 1942 until his death in 1962.2 He andhis wife, Professor Soia Mentschikoff, also served as reporters for three ofthe nine “articles”--or principal parts--of the U.C.C.3  Throughout thisprocess, Llewellyn consistently strived to make the U.C.C. distinct fromother statutes and laws by imbuing it with features that reflected his deeplyheld juridical beliefs. 4 For these reasons, the U.C.C. has acquired *542nicknames like “Karl’s Kode”5  and “Lex Llewellyn.”6 
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT2
7 See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Jurisprudence: Realism in Theory andPractice (1962) (presenting a series of essays of the version of Realism Llewellyndeveloped from the 1920s until his death in 1962).8 Professor B rian Leiter concisely has summarized the typical contemporaryunderstanding of Legal Realism as follows: “Legal Realism is fundamentally: (1)a descriptive theory about the nature of judicial decision, according to which, (2)judges exercise unfettered discretion, in order (3)  to reach results based on theirpersonal tastes and values, which (4)  they then rationalize after-the-fact withappropriate legal rules and reasons.” Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism:Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 268 (1997). See alsoJames J. White, The Influence of American Legal Realism on Article 2 of theUniform Commercial Code, in Prescrip tive Formality and Normative Rationalityin Modern Legal Systems 401, 401 (W erner Krawietz et al. eds., 1994) (arguingthat the Legal Realists believed that “judges’ decisions arise not merely from therules they state in their opinions, but at least as much from unstated reasons--fromthe facts before them, from the expectation of the parties in the trade, and from thejudges’ own judgment about fairness.”). As Leiter points out, however, thischaracterization lacks complete accuracy because numerous writers identifiedthemselves with Legal Realism, but had somewhat different ideas. See Leiter, supra,at 269. 9 See Llewellyn, supra note 7, at 189-90; Leiter, supra note 8, at 284.10 See Twining, supra note 1, at 321-22 (describing how and why Llewellynwanted to implement his jurisprudential views into the drafting of the U.C.C.): 1White & Summers, supra note 1 , § 1, at 3  (describing the history of the project). 
Llewellyn was a leader of the Legal Realist movement that emerged inthis country during the 1920s and 1930s.7  Scholars associated with thisschool of jurisprudence did not agree on everything, but they all held anintense interest in understanding what actually influences judges when theydecide cases.8  As discussed more fully within, some of the Legal Realists,including Llewellyn, shared a prescriptive vision for crafting legislation.They believed that statutes should seek to improve judicial decisions byrecognizing that judges inevitably act with considerable discretion, and byseeking to guide this discretion rather than futilely attempting to eliminateit.9 When Llewellyn set to work on the U.C.C. project, he naturally wantedto implement his jurisprudential ideas.10  As the following in-depthdiscussion will show, Llewellyn succeeded in giving the U.C.C. at leastfive important features inspired by *543 Legal Realism. In particular, as aresult of his influence, the U.C.C.: •  favored open-ended standards over firm rules; • avoided formalities; 
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11 Arguably, Llewellyn also sought to make the U.C.C. nonexclusive byincorporating rules established by prior dealings between the parties and by customsand usages of trade. See U.C.C. § 1-205(3) (1999) (“A course of dealing betweenparties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which they are engaged orof which they are or should be aware give particular meaning to and supplement orqualify terms of an agreement.”); id. § 1-205(5) ( “An applicable usage of trade inthe place where any part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting theagreement as to that part of the performance.”). I have not discussed this aspect ofthe U.C.C.’s nonexclusivity in this article for two reasons. First, prior contract lawalso incorporated this feature to a large extent. See U.C.C. § 1-205 cmt. (citing theUniform Sales Act §§ 9(1), 15(5), 18(2), and 71 as relevant prior uniform statutorycodifications); Restatement of the Law of Contracts §§ 247, 248 (1932) (makingoperative both usages between the parties and usages of trade). Second, I found itdifficult to discern whether the recent revisions to the U.C.C. have retained orrejected this principle separately from their more general abandonment ofnon-exclusivity. For an excellent recent review and criticism of the U.C.C.’sincorporation of customs and usages of trade, see Lisa Bernstein, The QuestionableEmpirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: a Preliminary Study, 66 U.Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1999).12 See U.C.C. art. 2A (1999), 1B U.L.A. 647 (1989); U.C.C . art. 4A (1999), 2BU.L.A. 455 (1991). 13 See Kathleen Patchel, The Uniform Commercial Code Survey Part I:Introduction, 53 Bus. Law. 1457 (1998) (summarizing the various developments).14 The American Law Institute (“A.L.I.”) and N.C.C.U.S.L. have been workingon these articles for several years, and had hoped to complete Articles 2 and 2A in1999, and Article 1 in 2001. See id. In July 1999, however, the N.C.C.U.S.L.decided that the draft of Article  2 would face too much industry opposition topermit its widespread adoption. Accordingly, it has decided  to redirect Article  2’sdrafting to make it less controversial. This development will delay promulgation ofrevised versions of Articles 1, 2 , and 2A for an unknown period. See State LawCommission Appoints New Group to Finish Drafting Work on Articles 2, 2A, 68
• required and facilitated the “purposive interpretation” of its provisions;• did not attempt to provide an exclusive statement of the law, butinstead directed courts to supplement its rules with general legal andequitable principles;11  and • provided a range of remedies that principally served to make injuredparties whole. In recent years, the U.C.C. has undergone considerable expansion andrevision.  Article 2A on leases of goods and Article 4A on funds transfershave been added.12  Articles 2A, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, and 9 have been extensivelyrevised.13  Moreover, drafts of new versions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A arecurrently in the works. 14
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U.S.L.W. 2120 (Aug. 31, 1999); ALI and NCCUSL Announce New D raftingCommittee for UCC Articles 2 and 2A (Aug. 18, 1999) < http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/ucc2a2.htm> [hereinafter ALI/NCCUSL Press Release] (describing thecurrent status of these revisions).15 Many commercial law textbooks call attention to the change in jurisprudentialstyles. See, e.g., Robert L. Jordan & W illiam D. Warren, Negotiable Instruments,Payments and Credits 2 (4th ed. 1997) (noting that the “drafting style reflected inrevised Article 3,” for which the authors served as reporters, “is quite different fromthat of the previous statute”).16 See infra Part I. 17 See infra Part II.18 See infra Part III. 
*544 This article contends that these substantial additions and revisionshave done more than merely alter and augment the legal rules in the U.C.C.They have had the additional effect of diminishing Llewellyn’s jurispruden-tial contributions. The modern drafters and revisers of the U.C.C. have notstrived to retain the five legislative features identified above. Indeed, insome instances, they specifically have rejected them and the philosophybehind them. This thesis may strike those who have not been following U.C.C.developments as rather extraordinary because the U.C.C. long has beenregarded as the apogee of the Legal Realists’ practical accomplishments.Those who have practiced or taught in the area of commercial law,however, will find the argument less surprising, for the jurisprudentialchanges to the U.C.C. during the recent revisions would have been hard tomiss.15  Yet, no one has attempted to analyze the U.C.C.’s new jurispru-dence in a systematic manner. As a result, even readers familiar with theamendments to the U.C.C. may find the extent to which Llewellyn’sinfluence has faded startling. The remainder of this article contains four parts.  Part I describes theU.C.C. and its amendments over the past five decades.16  Part II then seeksto document the U.C.C.’s jurisprudential shifting.17 Considering each of thefive features listed above, it contrasts the early versions of the U.C.C. withthe present official text and the latest drafts of proposed revisions. It showsin each instance that, while Llewellyn’s jural input has persisted to someextent, it has diminished considerably. Part III discusses the implications of this development.18  It infers fromLlewellyn’s fading imprint on the U.C.C. that his brand of Legal Realismno longer holds its dominant position in American legal thought. It furtherconjectures that our legal *545 culture may have become too pluralistic to
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19 See infra Conclusion.20 See Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Service--A Centennial History ofthe National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 17-18 (1991)(describing the movement for uniform state laws). 21 See id. at 11.22 See generally id. 23 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 2-3.24 See William Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment ofthe Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U . Miami L. Rev. 1, 2  (1967). 25 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.26 See U nif. Sales Act, 1 U.L.A. 1  (1950). 27 See Unif. Warehouse Receipts Act, 3 U.L.A. 1 (1959).28 See Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography 219 (1940). 
expect major codifications to reflect forever any one school of jurispru-dence. The last section states a brief conclusion.19  It urges judges and lawyersat a minimum to recognize the new character of the U.C.C. It also calls formodifying the draft of the proposed revision to Article 1 to make itsprovisions consistent with the U.C.C.’s new character. I. Creation And Revision Of The U.C.C.A. Origins of the UniformCommercial Code In the late 1800s, various leaders of the bar urged the enactment ofuniform state laws on commercial subjects.20  Their call led to theformation of a group called the National Conference of Commissioners onUniform State Laws (“N.C.C.U.S.L.”) in 1892.21  From that time until thepresent, the N.C.C.U.S.L. has sought to draft model laws and to persuadelegislatures to enact them.22 The N.C.C.U.S.L. achieved early success.  In 1896, the N.C.C.U.S.L.published the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (“N.I.L.”), a model lawgoverning checks, notes, and bills of exchange.23  Many states quicklyenacted the N.I.L. By 1940, the N.C.C.U.S.L. had convinced every stateand various other American jurisdictions to adopt it.24 Inspired by the favorable reception of the N.I.L., the N.C.C.U.S.L.promulgated several additional model uniform laws.25  These laws includedthe Uniform Sales Act26  and the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act,27  bothdrafted by Professor Samuel Williston,28  and the Uniform Trust Receipts
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29 See Unif. Trust Receipts Act, 9C U.L.A. 231 (1957).30 See id.; Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on UniformState Laws and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting 595-607 (1925)(statement of Karl Llewellyn as draftsman of the U niform Trust Receipts Act). 31 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.32 See id . 33 See id.34 See 1 William T. Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series 1-101:1(1998) (identifying the subjects and principal drafters of the U.C.C.). 35 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.36 See James J. Connolly et al., Alcoholism and Angst in the Life and Work ofKarl Llewellyn, 24 Ohio N .U. L. Rev. 43, 97-98 (1998); Fred H. Miller, RealismNot Idealism in Uniform Laws--Observations from the Revision of the UCC, 39 S.Tex. L. Rev. 707, 710 n.10 (1998). 37 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, § 1, at 3.38 The principal drafters of the other articles of the U.C .C. included WilliamProsser, Fairfax Leary, Jr., Friedrich Kessler, Charles Bunn, Allison Dunham, andGrant Gilmore. See id. at 4. 
Act,29 *546 drafted by Professor Karl Llewellyn.30  Many state legislaturesadopted these model laws.31 In 1940, William Schnader, who was then the President of theN.C.C.U.S.L., proposed creating a complete commercial code that wouldaddress and unify a variety of different business-related laws.32  In view ofthe massive nature of this undertaking, the N.C.C.U.S.L. agreed to work onthe project with the American Law Institute (“A.L.I.”),33  which hadpublished the Restatements of the Law of Contracts, Torts, Property, andother subjects. The A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. decided that the U.C.C. should addresseight subjects: sales of goods, commercial paper (negotiable instruments),bank deposits and collections, letters of credit, bulk sales, documents oftitle, investment securities, and secured credit.34  The N.C.C.U.S.L.appointed Llewellyn to serve as the “Chief Reporter.”35  Despite hisnontraditional legal views and spirited personality, the N.C.C.U.S.L.evidently thought that his energy, enthusiasm, experience in commerciallaw, and prior success with the Uniform Trusts Receipts Act, made him anappealing candidate for the position.36  Llewellyn’s wife, Soia Ment-schikoff, served as his principal assistant.37  Together, they worked with anumber of the most gifted academic and practicing attorneys in drafting theU.C.C.38 
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39 See Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779, 779(1953).40 See id . at 779-82. 41 See 1 White & Summers, supra note 1, §1, at 4.42 See id . §1, at 2. 43 See id.44 See id . 45 See id.46 See id . 47 See id . §1, at 4. 48 See generally New York State  Law Revision Commission, Report of the LawRevision Commission for 1956 68 (1956) (concluding the “the Uniform Commer-cial Code is not satisfactory in its present form and cannot be made satisfactorywithout comprehensive re-examination and revision”). 49 See 1  White & Summers, supra note 1 , §1, at 4. 50 See id . 
In drafting the U.C.C., Llewellyn wanted to improve upon various prioruniform acts that the N.C.C.U.S.L. had promulgated*547 on commericalsubjects.39  He wanted to create a statute that would reduce conflicts amongjurisdictions, that would clarify the law, that would make the law moreaccessible, and that would modernize legal rules to keep them in harmonywith commercial developments.40  Moreover, as Part III of this article willshow, the project gave Llewellyn a practical opportunity to implementmany of his jurisprudential ideas. B. Promulgation and Enactment The A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated the first version of the U.C.C.in 1951, calling it the “1952 Official Text.”41  This initial version containednine substantive articles. Article 1 stated general principles and definitionsthat applied throughout the Code.42  Article 2 covered sales of goods.43Articles 3 and 4 dealt with commercial paper and bank deposits andcollections. Article 5 addressed letters of credit. 44 Articles 6, 7, and 8governed bulk sales, documents of title, and investment securities.45Finally, Article 9 covered security interests in personal property.46 Pennsylvania enacted the 1952 Official Text in 1953.47  During the nextfew years, a law reform commission in New York reviewed the model lawand identified numerous problems that needed to be corrected before NewYork could adopt the Code.48  In 1957 and 1958, the A.L.I. andN.C.C.U.S.L. modified the U.C.C. in response to these recommendations.49Minor additional changes followed in 1962.50 
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51 See id . §1, at 5. 52 See Christian Callens, Comment, Louisiana Civil Law and The UniformCommercial Code: Interpreting the New Louisiana U.C.C.-Inspired Sales Articleson Price, 69  Tul. L. Rev. 1649, 1650-51 (1995). 53 See 1  White & Summers, supra note 1 , §2, at 5. 54 See Negotiable Instruments and Banking Transactions Act, Law No. 176 ofAug. 31, 1996, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 19, § 401 (Supp. 1997) (adopting articles 3, 4,and 4A). 55 See 2  White & Summers, supra note 1 , §2, at 5. 56 See id . § 23-1, at 240 & n.1. 57 See William M. Burke et al., Interim Report on the Activities of the Article9 Study Committee, 46 Bus. Law. 1883, 1884 (1991) (indicating that only Vermontdid not adopt the  revised  version of Article 9). 58 Compare U.C.C. art. 8 (1977), with U.C.C. art. 8, 2C U.L.A. 267, 267 (1991).59 See M iller, supra  note 36, at 714. 60 See id . 61 See id . 
*548 These early revisions corrected shortcomings in the U.C.C., andmade it acceptable to legislatures across the nation. By 1968, every stateexcept Louisiana had adopted every article of the U.C.C.51 Louisianainitially had difficulty incorporating the U.C.C. into its civil law system,but eventually enacted much of it or modified other state laws to make themsimilar to the U.C.C.52  The District of Columbia and the U.S. VirginIslands have enacted all of the U.C.C.,53  and Puerto Rico has enacted someof it.54 A major revision of Article 9 occurred in 1972, but the changes did notalter its theory, scope, or style. 55 Instead, the amendments mostly addressedtechnical problems that had arisen with the original draft. 56 Eventually,forty-nine states adopted the revised version of Article 9.57  The draftersalso revised Article 8 in 1977.58 C. Extensive Modern Revisions Starting in the late 1980s, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. began what hasbecome an extensive expansion and overhaul of the U.C.C.  The processgenerally has proceeded as follows.  Upon hearing persuasive argumentsfor adding or revising an article, the Executive Committee of theN.C.C.U.S.L. and the Council of the A.L.I. have voted to begin newdrafting.59  The President of N.C.C.U.S.L. then has appointed a draftingcommittee. 60 This committee typically has consisted of about a dozenmembers, a few from the A.L.I. and the rest from the *549 N.C.C.U.S.L.61Usually one or two law professors, who are also members of the A.L.I.,
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62 Prefatory notes to each of the revised articles identify the various persons whohave worked on them. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 3 pref. note (1990). 63 The N.C.C.U.S.L. maintains a website presenting facts about the revisedU.C.C. articles. This site lists the persons who worked on the drafts and theendorsements by the American Bar Association. See The National Conference ofCommissioners on Uniform State Laws (last modified Aug. 24, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org>. 64 See U .C.C. art. 2A (1987); Unif. Commercial Code art. 2A, 1B U.L.A. 647,649  (1989). 65 See id . (1990); 1B  U.L.A. supp. 182, 184 (1990). 66 See id . (1989); 2B  U.L.A. 455, 455 (1991). 67 See U .C.C. art. 3 (1990); 2 U.L.A. 5 , 5 (1991). 68 See U .C.C. art. 5 (1995); 2B U.L.A. 133, 133 (Supp. 1999). 69 See U.C.C. art. 8 (1994); 2C U .L.A. 47, 47 (Supp. 1999).70 See U .C.C. art. 9 (1999); 3 U.L.A. 9, 9 (Supp. 1999) (effective July 1, 2001).71 See U .C.C. art. 4 (1990); 2B U.L.A. 5, 5  (1991). 72 See U .C.C. art. 6 (1987); 2C U.L.A. 5, 5 , 7 (1991). 73 See supra note 14.74 See supra note 14. 75 See supra note 14. 
have served as the reporter(s) of the articles. In addition, the draftingcommittee has had the input of an appointed review committee and variousadvisors and consultants.62  After completing the drafting, the A.L.I. andN.C.C.U.S.L. then have voted on whether to approve the revised articles.Upon approval by both organizations, and endorsement by the AmericanBar Association, the N.C.C.U.S.L. has presented the revisions to the statelegislatures for enactment into law.63 Through this process, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. promulgated theoriginal version of Article 2A on leases of goods in 1987,64  and a revisedversion of Article 2A in 1990.65  In 1989, they created Article 4A on fundstransfers.66  They subsequently revised Articles 3,67  5,68  8,69  and 9,70  andsubstantially amended Article 4.71  In addition, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L.have recommended that states either adopt a revised version of Article 6 orrepeal the original version.72 For the past several years, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. also have beenworking on complete revisions of Articles 1, 2, and 2A.73  At one point,they expected to promulgate the final official texts of these articles in 1999or 2000,74  but disagreement has delayed the project.75  Of the entire code,only Article 7 remains unchanged and not under revision. The following
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76 See supra note 14.77See ALI/NCCUSL Press Release, supra note 14.78See S.D. Codified Laws § 57A-2A-101 (1999) (pre-revision version of ofarticle 2A). 79 Ronald DeKoven served as reporter for the original version of Article 2A. See1B U.L.A. 648 (1999). 80 The 1987 revision substantially changed Article 6. The 1989 revisionsuggested as alternatives either repealing Article 6 or adopting the 1987 OfficialText. See 6C Hawkland, supra note 34, §§ 6-101 to 6-102.81 Five states have adopted and retained the 1987 revision. Thirty-eight stateshave repealed Article 6. See A Few Facts About Revised Article 6 of the UCC (lastmodified Jan. 11, 2000) <http:// www.nccusl.org/factsheet/ucc6-fs.html> (listingstates that have adopted the revision or repealed the original).
table *550 summarizes the status of each of the articles of the U.C.C. sincethe late 1980s: 
Art. Title Status ofRevisions Status ofRevisions Reporter(s)1 General Provisions In progress n/a Neil Cohen2   Sales   In progress76  n/a   Henry Ga-briel772A   Leases   Added 1987,Amended1990, & InProgress   
48 / 4778  HenryGabriel79   
3   NegotiableInstruments   Revised 1990  49   William War-ren & RobertJordan   4  Bank Deposits &Collections   Amended1990   49   William War-ren & RobertJordan   4A   Funds T ransfers   Added 1989   52   William War-ren & RobertJordan   5 Letters of Credit  5   Revised 1995 38 James J.White   6   Bulk Sales   Revised 1987& 198980  5 / 3881  Steven Harris& W illiamHawkland   7   Documents of Title   No revision   n/a   n/a   8   Investment Securities  Revised 1994  48   James Rogers   
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT 11
82 U.C.C. art. 5 pref. note (1999). 83 My colleague, Professor Andy Spanogle, who has served as a member of theA.L.I. for many years, informs me that he has observed a great increase in thenumber of lobbyists attending U.C.C. drafting meetings. See also Miller, supra note36, at 719-20 (describing industry input into  the drafting). 84 See Gregory E. Maggs, New Payment Devices and General Principles ofPayment Law, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 753, 773-75 (1997) (discussing the historyof the Uniform New Payments Code). 
9   Secured  Transactions  Revised1999, (effec-tive July 1,2001)   
5   Charles Moo-ney & StevenHarris   
*551 The drafting process has not been confidential. On the contrary,numerous outsiders have had access to the proposed revisions, and havehad the opportunity to influence their substance. For example, the prefatorynote to the revised version of Article 5 on letters of credit explains: Hundreds of groups were invited to participate in the drafting process.Twenty Advisors were appointed, representing a cross-section of interestedparties.  In addition 20 Observers regularly attended drafting meetings andover 100 were on the mailing list to receive all drafts of the revision.  TheDrafting Committee meetings were open and all those who attended wereafforded full opportunity to express their views and participate in thedialogue.  The Advisors and Observers were a balanced group with tenrepresentatives of users (Beneficiaries and Applicants); five representativesof governmental agencies; five representatives of the U.S. Council onInternational Banking (USCIB); seven from major banks in letter of credittransactions; eight from regional banks; and seven law professors whoteach and write on Letters of Credit. . . . .  The drafts were regularlyreviewed and discussed in The Business Lawyer, Letter of Credit Update,and in other publications.82 *552 The influence from consumer and industrygroups, according to some observers, has increased greatly in the pastdecade.83  Some evidence of the power of outsiders comes from recentfailures of three proposed articles. First, in the early 1980s, the A.L.I. andN.C.C.U.S.L. worked on an article that would have covered all paymenttransactions. This project engendered controversy among banks andconsumer groups and ultimately had to be abandoned.84  Second, the A.L.I.and N.C.C.U.S.L. worked for several years on a new proposed Article 2B,which would have governed computer information transactions. In 1999,however, the A.L.I. and N.C.C.U.S.L. decided that Article 2B would notbecome part of the UCC; instead, the N.C.C.U.S.L. would promulgate the
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT12
85 See N.C.C.U.S.L. to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Computer InformationTransactions Act (Apr. 7, 1999) <http:// www.nccusl.org/pressrel/2brel.html>. 86 See ALI/NCCUSL Press Release, supra note 14. 87 See id . 88 Larry T. Garvin, The Changed (and Changing?) Uniform Commercial Code,26 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 285, 286 (1999). 89 See  Mark P. Gergan, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in theAmerican Common Law, 68 Fordham L. Rev. 407, 409 n.3. (1999) (citing anddiscussing numerous sources addressing the distinction between rules andstandards) . 
law as the “Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act.”85  Finally,as noted above, the proposed revised Article 2 recently failed to gain theapproval of the N.C.C.U.S.L.86  Objections by industry groups suggestedto the N.C.C.U.S.L. that state legislatures would not support the revision.87II. The U.C.C.’s Distinctive Jurisprudential Features The revisions to the U.C.C. have added many new legal rules, and havealtered the substance of numerous existing rules.  Lawyers familiar withpre-revision versions of the U.C.C. have had to relearn much of what theypreviously studied.  One writer has lamented that the “Uniform CommercialCode of today is not the Uniform Commercial Code of our youth.”88 The changes to the U.C.C., however, have done more than alter thesubstance of the law.  They also have eroded the most *553 importantjurisprudential characteristics that Llewellyn gave the U.C.C. Thefollowing discussion shows how the additions and revisions have notpreferred standards over rules, have not avoided formalities, have notsought to foster purposive interpretation, have tried to make the U.C.C. amore exclusive statement of the law, and have fashioned remedies based onconsiderations other than fully compensating aggrieved parties. A. Using Standards Instead of Rules Llewellyn and his collaborators made the U.C.C. distinct from otherstatutes by striving to employ open-ended “standards” instead of bright-line“rules.” Although disagreement exists over the difference between rulesand standards,89  commentators typically distinguish them in the followingmanner. Rules generally define the permitted or prohibited conduct withprecision, leaving the courts to determine only what happened. Standards,
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by contrast, usually require courts to decide not only what happened, butalso to some extent what the law should permit and what it should not.90 Consider, for example, section 2-205 on firm offers.91  In this section,the drafters made offers by merchants temporarily irrevocable if themerchants had promised to keep them open, even if the merchants receivedno consideration for their promises. In writing section 2-205, the draftersneeded to specify a period of irrevocability. They could have used a rule,saying, for example, that firm offers cannot be revoked for ninety days.Instead, they chose to employ a standard. Section 2-205 says that, unlessotherwise indicated, a firm offer will remain irrevocable for “a reasonabletime” up to three months even without consideration.92  In applying thisstandard, a court must determine both how long an offer has remained *554open and the reasonableness of the period under the particular facts. Llewellyn did not invent standards.  They have been used for centuriesin legislative documents.  The Constitution, for example, prohibits “crueland unusual” punishments93  and “unreasonable” searches and seizures.94Even prior to the U.C.C., commercial laws relied on standards. Forexample, the Uniform Sales Act--drafted by Samuel Williston, a strongopponent of Legal Realism--had open-ended standards.95 The U.C.C., however, differed from other laws because of the extentand frequency of its reliance on standards instead of rules.96  Article 2 aloneuses the term “reasonable” in numerous contexts, such as good faith,97  the
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statute of frauds,98  firm offers,99  contract formation,100  battle of the forms,101 construction of terms,102  modifications,103  and dozens of additionalprovisions.104 The other articles of the U.C.C. all contain similar examples.The original Article 5, for example, employed the term “reasonable” tospecify the duration of notations of credit.105  Similarly, Article 9 says thatsecured parties may dispose of collateral after taking “commerciallyreasonable” steps.106 Indeed, so successful were the drafters in implementing open-endedstandards that many observers thought they went too far.  Professor DavidMellinkoff, for example, complained: *555 “The word reasonable, effectivein small doses, has been administered by the bucket, leaving the corpus ofthe Code reeling in dizzy confusion.” 107 Professor Richard Danzigdescribed the drafters’ overuse of standards as a “renunciation of legislativeresponsibility and power.”108 The early versions of the U.C.C., to be sure, also employed a number ofbright-line rules.  Most notably, the pre-revision versions of Articles 3 and4, which dealt with negotiable instruments, contained very definiteprovisions on liability.109  The same held true for the pre-revision version
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110 See, e.g., U.C.C. §5-114(1) (1994) (revised 1995), 2B U.L.A. 614 (1991)(stating the issuer’s duty to honor drafts in unequivocal terms). 111 See U.C.C. §2-201(1) (1999).112 See, e .g., id. §§2-706, 2-708, 2-709 (measures of seller’s damages); id.§§2-712, 2-714 (measures of buyer’s damages). 113 For a  counterexample in which the drafters did use a standard of reasonable-ness, see, for example, id. §2-714(1) (stating that when a buyer has acceptednonconforming goods, he may receive compensation for the nonconformity “asdetermined  in any manner which is reasonable”). 114 See Llewellyn, supra note 39, at 782 (arguing against legislative draftingefforts that seek to “corral” rather than guide judges). 115 Twining, supra note 1, at 336. 116 See U .C.C. §1-102 cmt. 1 (1999). 117 See Jean Braucher, The Repo Code: A Study of Adjustment to Uncertaintyin Commercial Law, 75 Wash. U. L.Q. 549, 555-56 (1997); Leiter, supra note 8, at284-85. 118 Grant Gilmore, T he Ages of American Law 85 (1977). 
of Article 5 on letters of credit. 110 Even in Article 2, Llewellyn declined touse standards instead of rules in some instances. For example, the statuteof frauds requires a “writing” as opposed to some “reasonable evidence”of the making of a contract. 111 Likewise, Article 2 generally sets forthspecific damage measurements,112  rather than merely telling judges to useany reasonable means of compensating the plaintiff for losses.113 Llewellyn, however, usually favored standards, and had severaljurisprudential reasons for this preference.  First, Llewellyn generallytrusted judges and business persons to develop, recognize, and followcommercial norms.114  As one commentator explained: The Code is founded not only on faith in the capacity of the businesscommunity for satisfactory self-regulation within a framework of verybroadly drafted rules, but also on a faith *556 in judges to make honest,sensible, commercially well-informed decisions once they have been givensome base-lines for judgment.115 Second, Llewellyn wanted to make the Code a durable, “semi-perman-ent” body of legislation.116  He believed that using open-ended standardswould allow courts to adjust the law as commercial practices change,without having to wait for statutory amendments.117  Grant Gilmore hasexplained in this regard that the U.C.C. sought to “[abolish] the pastwithout attempting to control the future.”118 Third, Llewellyn did not see much advantage to rules.  He doubted thatthey actually created more certainty than standards.  On the contrary,
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119 Twining, supra note 1, at 336. 120 See id . 121 See, e .g., U.C.C §§ 1-102(3), 2-103(1)(b), 2A-103(1)(u), 3-103(a)(4),4-103(d), 4A-105(a)(6),  5-108(b), 6-103(3)(i), 7-204(1), 8-102(a)(10),9-104(a)(4)(C). 122 See U .C.C. art. 3 pref. note (1999) (Benefits in the Public Interest). 123 See id . §§ 3-103(a)(7), 4-104(c). 124 See id. §3-405 (addressing forgery of indorsements by certain employees).125 See, e .g., id. §4A-202(b)-(c) (allowing banks to  adopt reasonable securitymeasures); § 4A-204(a) (requiring customers to report an unauthorized paymentorder within a reasonable time not to exceed 90 days).126 Id. §4A-102 cmt. (emphasis added). 127 See id . §4A-211(d). 128 Id. §4A-402(b), (d) (stating liability for completed and uncompleted paymentorders). 
Llewellyn thought that “legal rules have a . . . marginal role to play ingenerating business expectations.”119  Llewellyn believed that certaintyexists because the market creates uniform practices.120 The recent changes to the U.C.C. have not eliminated all of itsstandards.  Every article, for example, continues to use the term “reason-able.”121  At the same time, however, the drafters of the new and revisedarticles of the U.C.C. often have curtailed the use of standards, and haveresorted instead to rules. For instance, in revising Articles 3 and 4, thedrafters announced that they were seeking to improve the certainty of thelaw and reduce litigation.122  They did this in part by tightening open-endedstandards. The new version of Article 3 now defines more specifically whatconstitutes “ordinary care” for a bank.123  It further creates some per secategories of failure to exercise ordinary care.124 *557 The drafters of the new Article 4A similarly eschewed open-endedstandards. Although they employed tests of “reasonableness” in a fewinstances,125  they generally tried to establish firm rules. An officialcomment to Article 4A says: “A deliberate decision was . . . made to useprecise and detailed rules to assign responsibility, define behavioral norms,allocate risks and establish limits on liability, rather than to rely on broadlystated, flexible principles.”126  For example, the drafters specified a certaindate upon which unaccepted payment orders become canceled by operationof law.127  They also used specific rules to determine who bears liability forunsuccessful funds transfers.128 The drafters of the revised version of Article 5 similarly recognized that“[c]ertainty of payment . . . is a core element of the commercial utility of
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letters of credit.”129  They thus tightened the law considerably. For example,the revised Article 5 now “clearly and forcefully states the independenceof letter of credit obligations.”130  It also institutes a rule of “strict compli-ance” to specify when the issuer of a letter of credit may dishonor apresentation,131  and defines specifically what constitutes strict compliance.132 The article further narrows the definition of good faith because “greatercertainty of obligations is necessary and is consistent with the goals ofspeed and low cost.”133 The drafters of the revised version of Article 8 also attempted to avoidstandards like “reasonableness.” For example, section 8-110 sets forthdefinite choice-of-law rules, rejecting more open-ended principles.134 Theofficial comment explains: *558 Because the policy of this section is to enable parties to determine,in advance and with certainty, what law will apply to transactions governedby this Article, the validation of selection of governing law by agreementis not conditioned upon a determination that the jurisdiction whose law ischosen bear a “reasonable relation” to the transaction.135 The drafters of the new version of Article 9 also stressed certainty overflexibility.  For example, they made the priority rules in connection withsecurities more rigid.  The official comment justifies the move toward firmrules as follows: One of the circumstances that led to the revision was the concern thatuncertainty in the application of the rules on secured transactions involvingsecurities and other financial assets could contribute to systemic risk byimpairing the ability of financial institutions to provide liquidity to themarkets in times of stress.136 As these changes indicate, the drafters of the new and revised articlesoften have moved away from open-ended standards.  They have worriedthat standards produce litigation.  They also have doubted that the benefitsof flexibility justify the costs of the uncertainty that it produces.  While
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137 2 W hite & Summers, supra note 1 , §26-20, at 554-55. 138 See B lack’s Law Dictionary 652 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “formality” as the“conditions, in regard to method, order, arrangement, use of technical expressions,performance of specific acts, etc., which are required by the law in the making ofcontracts or conveyances, or in the taking of legal proceedings, to insure theirvalidity and regularity”). 139 See Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and Modification Under RevisedArticle 2, 35 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1305, 1311 (1994) (discussing Llewellyn’s focuson the intention of the parties). 140 See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89Harv. L. Rev. 1685, 1691-92 (1976) (discussing how the traditional requirement ofan offer and acceptance is a formality). 141 U.C.C. §2-204(1) (1999). 
standards may have benefits in some contexts, such as those addressed inthe Bill of Rights, the drafters appear to have doubted Llewellyn’s beliefthat they are preferable to rules in commercial law.  Professor James J.White, the reporter for the revised Article 5, has taken this positionexplicitly.  He has expressed that it is “[b]etter to leave an occasionalwidow penniless by the harsh application of the law than to disruptthousands of other transactions by injecting uncertainty and by encouragingswarms of potential litigants and their lawyers to challenge what wouldotherwise be clear and fair rules.”137 *559 B. Avoiding Formalities Llewellyn also wanted to make the U.C.C. distinct from prior commer-cial acts by avoiding “formalities.” 138 In other words, he did not think theU.C.C. should treat commercial transactions differently depending onwhether the parties used technical words, or structured their transaction inparticular ways, or created special kinds of records. He considered theactual facts and circumstances of commercial transactions much moreimportant than the forms that they might take.139  Where formalitiesformerly existed in the law, Llewellyn sought to eliminate them. For example, contract law traditionally required the formality of adistinct offer and acceptance before formation of a contract could occur.140In section 2-204, however, the U.C.C. eliminated the requirements of anoffer and acceptance for the formation of contract by saying: “A contractfor sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement,including conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of sucha contract.”141 
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Llewellyn was not a fanatic opponent of formalities.  In his view,formalities did not necessarily cause problems in commercial transactions.142  Indeed, at one time, he specifically questioned whether the law neededto enforce commercial promises not under seal.143  He also described thestatute of frauds as “an amazing product . . . . [a]fter two centuries and ahalf . . . better adapted to our needs than when it was first *560 passed.”144His view was that “a business economy demands a means of quick, not oneof ‘informal’ contracting.”145 Usually, however, Llewellyn still wanted to avoid formalities incommercial transactions for three reasons.  First, formalities can oftencreate injustices.146  For example, the statute of frauds may preventrecognition of a contract, even though the parties in fact had formed anagreement that they wanted the courts to enforce. Eliminating formalities,Llewellyn believed, may permit a fairer treatment of individual cases.147 Second, Llewellyn generally wanted the U.C.C. to reflect businesspractices,148  and worried that imposing formalities would stand at oddswith this goal. After all, some business persons would not know therequired forms or technical rules.149  Others who did know the law wouldhave to take cumbersome steps to rearrange their conduct in order toconform to the rules.150 
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Third, Llewellyn thought that many judges would seek to resolve casesin a just manner regardless of whether the parties satisfied requiredformalities. 151  In the extreme, they would decide on an outcome, thenmischaracterize the facts or legal authorities to support their decision, andthereby distort the law with their lack of candor.152  Eliminating formalitieswould aid judges and the justice system by allowing them to explain theirreasoning truthfully.153 *561 Llewellyn had considerable success in eliminating formalitiesfrom the U.C.C.154  For example, as noted above, the original Article 2greatly simplified the process of offer and acceptance in the law of sales.155 In addition, the U.C.C. created large exceptions to the traditional
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formalities imposed by the statute of frauds156  and the parol evidencerule.157  It also made seals completely inoperative.158 Perhaps most significantly, Articles 1 and 9 made the characterizationof different types of secured financing largely irrelevant.159  They treat allforms of liens, collateral, and pledges as creating a “security interest,”regardless of the names or forms used.160  For instance, they require courtsto treat a purported lease as a secured sale if the transaction has thecharacteristics of a secured sale,161  saying that “[w]hether a transactioncreates a lease or security interest is determined by the facts of each case”and listing various factors for the courts to consider.162 *562 Some opposition to formalities has persisted throughout the manyrecent changes to the U.C.C. 163 The June 1999 draft of the proposedrevision of Article 2 would lessen the impact of the statute of frauds in thecontext of sales of goods.164  The revised version of Article 3 now permitspresentment of negotiable instruments to take place electronically instead
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of only physically.165  Similarly, letters of credit no longer have to bewritten on paper.166  The statute of frauds in Article 8 has been removed.167Much more commonly, however, the drafters of the new and the revisedarticles have added formalities to the U.C.C.  In the June 1999 draft of theproposed revision of Article 2, for example, the drafters have taken a moreformal approach to the “battle of the forms” problem. A battle of the formsproblem arises when the offeree attempts to accept an offer, but states inthe acceptance terms that are different from, or additional to, the ones in theoffer. The current version of section 2-207 says that the terms of a contractmade by battling forms depend on what the parties would have consideredmaterial.168  The revised version of the section, by contrast, would state afixed rule that the contract simply includes whatever terms are common toboth the offer and acceptance.169 Article 2A created a statute of frauds for leases of goods,170  eventhough in most jurisdictions no writing previously had *563 been requiredfor enforcement of leases of personal property.171  The revised version ofArticle 3 specifies that any instrument having the form of a check must benegotiable.172 Unlike the issuer of a note, the drawer of a check may notprevent application of the holder in due course doctrine by writingsomething like “Not Negotiable” on the instrument.173 Although the new Article 4A does not require payment orders to takeany special form, it established numerous new formal requirements.  Thedrafters required over half a dozen different kinds of agreements or noticesto be in writing.  For example, an unauthorized payment order will not beeffective, even if it passes a security procedure, unless the customer“expressly agreed in writing” to be bound by any payment order that passed
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the security procedure.174  Similarly, a bank can limit its right to enforceverified payment orders only by “express written agreement.”175  A bank,moreover, can avoid responsibility for certain payment orders thatmisdescribe the beneficiary if the bank delivered to the customer a “signed. . . writing” stating information about the processing of payment orders.176In addition, a bank that delays or improperly executes a payment orderbears liability for consequential damages only “to the extent provided in anexpress written agreement.”177 The recently revised version of Article 9 also imposes new formalities.For example, a new provision recognizes and gives effect to a federalregulatory requirement that consumers receive written notices regardingwaiver of defense clauses.178  Another new section requires a written recordindicating that a creditor has decided to retain collateral in satisfaction ofthe debt.179 These examples of new and continuing formalities reveal that thedrafters of the various revisions did not oppose for *564 malities asstrongly as Llewellyn and his collaborators. On the contrary, they appearto have recognized that formalities may have some value. For example, theycan promote clarity in the law. One observer has commented that Articles4A, 5, and 8 now tend to operate almost exclusively on symbols.180 Banksand businesses favor this development because “[i]f these symbols areappropriately communicated, authenticated, and preserved, then there isabsolutely no room for ordinary factual disputes.”181  Even consumers mayfavor formalities because formalities allow them to distinguish betweenacts that have legal consequences and those that do not. Several commenta-tors--including the reporters of the revised Article 5 and the June 1999 draftof the proposed revision of Article 2--have remarked: Rules specifying how to “make it legal” are fundamental. Without them,private ordering under law could not exist. One of the primary functions of
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bodies of commercial and consumer law is to facilitate and sanction privateordering and private autonomy.182 C. Purposive Interpretation Llewellyn and his collaborators wanted to require and facilitate the“purposive interpretation” of the U.C.C.’s provisions.183  In other words,they did not want judges necessarily to apply the U.C.C.’s provisions asthey were literally written.184  Instead, they wanted judges to understand thegoals of the law, and to interpret and apply its provisions to carry out thelaw’s purposes.185 *565 Judges practiced “purposive interpretation” before promulgationof the U.C.C. Chief Justice John Marshall, for example, arguably usedpurposive interpretation in construing the Constitution.186 Llewellyn,however, wanted to make the U.C.C. the first major codification thatstrived to help judges in this task. Prior uniform acts--like most laws--merely stated rules and standards.187  They did not attempt to tell judgesexplicitly what purposes the law sought to serve.188  They also did not insistthat judges engage in purposive interpretation. Llewellyn desired a newkind of legislation.189  He said: “If a statute is to make sense, it must be read
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in the light of some assumed purpose. A statute merely declaring a rule,with no purpose or objective, is nonsense.”190 The U.C.C. specifically calls for purposive interpretation in its firstsubstantive provision.  Section 1-102(1) says: “This Act shall be liberallyconstrued and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” 191Carrying this injunction further, the official comment to section 1-102instructs: The Act should be construed in accordance with its underlying purposesand policies.  The text of each section should be read in the light of thepurpose and policy of the rule or principle in question, as also of the Act asa whole, *566 and the application of the language should be construednarrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with the purposesand policies involved.192 Llewellyn and the other drafters of the U.C.C. did more in section 1-102than instruct judges to engage in purposive interpretation.  The drafters alsosought to help judges discern the purposes of the U.C.C.’s rules so that theywould find the task easier.  This assistance took two principal forms.  First,the drafters prepared “official comments” for every section of the U.C.C.193The functions served by these comments included explaining the goals ofthe statutory commands. Llewellyn wanted the comments to reveal “wherethe particular sections are trying to go.”194  Second, in various places, thedrafters incorporated statements of purpose directly into the statute. Forexample, the original version of Article 4 not only allowed banks to set the
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close of their business day at 2:00 p.m., but also explained the reason forthis rule. Section 4-107 said: For the purpose of allowing time to process items, prove balances andmake the necessary entries on its books to determine its position for theday, a bank may fix an afternoon hour of two P.M. or later as a cut-off hourfor the handling of money and items and the making of entries on itsbooks.195 The goal of promoting “purposive interpretation” stemmed directly fromLlewellyn’s conception of Legal Realism. Llewellyn believed that goodjudges would strive to do justice and promote sound legal policies. 196 Forthis reason he considered it more important to inform judges of the purposeof the law than to attempt to specify in a strict manner what the lawpermitted and what it did not. Indeed, Llewellyn rejected the notion thatlegislation should be phrased as though it were “written for dumbbelljudges whom you are trying to corral.”197 *567 In addition, Llewellyn was skeptical about the possibility ofeliminating ambiguity from statutes. He believed that telling judges thepurposes of statutes generally would do the most to help them resolve openquestions in a consistent manner: Borderline, doubtful, or uncontemplated cases are inevitable.  Reason-ably uniform interpretation by judges of different schooling, learning andskill is tremendously furthered if the reason which guides application of thesame language is the same reason in all cases.  A patent reason, moreover,tremendously decreases the leeway open to the skillful advocate forpersuasive distortion or misapplication of the language; it requires that anycontention, to be successfully persuasive, must make some kind of sense interms of the reason; it provides a real stimulus toward, though not anassurance of, corrective growth rather than straitjacketing of the Code byway of caselaw. 198 
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT 27
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Judges have cited section 1-102(1) in hundreds of cases.199  In manyinstances, they have recognized arguments against the purposive method ofconstruing statutes, but nevertheless have followed the section’s directive.For example, in In re Halmar Distributors, Inc.,200  the United States Courtof Appeals for the First Circuit had to interpret sections 9-103(1)(d)(i) and(ii). A question arose as to whether the court should read the provisionsliterally, or attempt to follow their purpose. The court recognized theexistence of jurisprudential disagreement on this issue, citing commentaryby Professor James J. White and Robert S. Summers in their UniformCommercial Code treatise.201  In the end, however, the court decided tofollow section 1-102(1), and to construe the provisions liberally in light oftheir purposes.202 *568 Karl Llewellyn, however, did not succeed entirely in fosteringpurposive interpretation. Relatively few sections in the U.C.C. contain thekind of explicit statement of purpose found in pre-revision section 4-107.203 In addition, many of the official comments did not provide the helpfulguidance that they might have. 204 The notorious comments followingsection 2-207 on the battle of forms provide a good example. 205 Thesecomments have confounded observers who have attempted to discern whatthe drafters wanted. 206The effort to state purposes ran into some difficulty because the draftersof the U.C.C. did not favor all of the provisions that they included.  Section2-201, the statute of frauds for sales of goods, provides one example. 207 Asnoted above, Llewellyn and other drafters of the U.C.C. generally did notlike formalities. Nevertheless, they apparently felt pressure to retain the
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statute of frauds.208  The official comments to section 2-201, therefore, donot seek to explain the goal or purpose of the general requirement of awriting. 209 Instead, they merely explain the elements.210  In contrast, thecomments to section 2-201 clearly state the reasons for exceptions to thegeneral requirement of a writing. For example, in discussing an exceptionthat applies when goods have been accepted or paid for, the officialcomments say: “Receipt and acceptance either of the goods or of the priceconstitutes an unambiguous overt admission by both parties that a contractactually exists.”211 Throughout the changes to the U.C.C., purposive interpretation haspersisted to some extent.  The 1997 draft of the proposed revision of Article1 retains a general provision, like the current section 1-102(1), whichdirects courts to engage in purposive*569 interpretation.212  In addition,when the drafters have created the new versions of other articles, they oftenhave spelled out the reasons for the changes. The revised Article 4 providesan excellent example. The drafters included expansive comments identify-ing the purpose of altering the legal rules.213  The comments allow courtsto know which rules make substantive changes,214  and which merely maketechnical drafting corrections.215 In addition, some new official comments in other articles overtly explainthe purposes of the law.  An official comment to the revised section 3-104,for instance, states the reasons for defining what constitutes a negotiableinstrument and what does not as follows: 
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216 U.C.C. §3-102 cmt. 2 (1999); see also id. §3-414 cmt. 5 (explaining thepurpose of preventing a drawer from issuing a check without recourse). 217 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-305 cmts. 1-5 (1999) (explaining in depth whichdefenses are applicable to holders in due course and non-holders in due course,without explaining the justification for the holder in due course doctrine).
Total exclusion from Article 3 of other promises or orders that are notpayable to bearer serves a useful purpose.  It provides a simple device toclearly exclude a writing that does not fit the pattern of typical negotiableinstruments and which is not intended to be a negotiable instrument.216 Enthusiasm for purposive interpretation, nonetheless, appears to havedeclined significantly during the recent revisions.  Although the evidencefor this proposition is largely impressionistic, it manifests itself in severalways.  First, in revising the U.C.C., the drafters greatly tightened thephrasing of all of the rules.  The revised Articles 3 and 4, for instance,contain more detailed rules than their predecessors, and these rules striveto eliminate previous ambiguities.  The same is true for the new Article 9,which is much longer than its predecessor.  A fair inference is that thedrafters slowly came to realize that it *570 is better to eliminate uncertain-ties in statutes than to expect judges to deal with them through purposiveinterpretation. Second, in creating new articles and in revising old articles, the drafterslargely abandoned the practice of stating the purpose of rules in the statuteitself.  The new Articles 2A and 4A, and the revised versions of Articles 3,4, 5, 6, and 8 contain few provisions that expressly state their purposes.Instead, like most other statutes, they mostly just contain rules. Third, although the drafters greatly expanded the official commentswhen revising the U.C.C., these new comments rarely say anything aboutthe goals of the law.  Instead, they are much more likely to provideillustrations showing how the language of the rules applies.217  Thecomments do not strive to show where the law is “trying to go,” asLlewellyn said of the original comments, but instead attempt to ensure thatjudges know what the rules are. Fourth, some of the newest official comments appear to take a hostileview of liberal construction and purposive interpretation.  The best exampleappears in the new Article 4A on funds transfers.  The official comment tosection 4A-102 indicates that courts should not stray from the carefullyformulated rules in the article, stating: 
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In the drafting of these rules, a critical consideration was that thevarious parties to funds transfers need to be able to predict risk withcertainty, to insure against risk, to adjust operational and security proce-dures, and to price funds transfer services appropriately.  This consider-ation is particularly important given the very large amounts of money thatare involved in funds transfers.218 Fifth, the courts in recent times noticeably have moved away frompurposive interpretation.  Between 1980 and 1995, courts cited section1-102(1)--the provision requiring purposive interpretation--more than 135times. 219  Since 1995, however, a *571 mere fourteen cases have citedsection 1-102(1).220  The recent widespread revisions to the U.C.C.presumably caused or contributed to this decrease. In lieu of purposive interpretation, courts are taking an increasinglytextualist approach in commercial cases.  For instance, in Corfan BancoAsuncion Paraguay v. Ocean Bank,221  a bank sent a fund transfer thatstated the beneficiary’s name correctly, but contained a nonexistent accountnumber. Section 4A-207 contains a dispositive rule when the name andaccount number refer to different persons, but not when the accountnumber refers to a nonexistent account.222  Commentators have recognizedthis problem as a drafting oversight, and have urged courts to apply theprovision anyway because it would serve the same purpose.223  The courtin Corfan, however, refused to apply the provision because it literally didnot cover the situation at issue.224  Ignoring section 1-102(1) and citingcases from other subject matters, the court said that judges foremost muststrive to apply the plain meaning of statutes. The court concluded: “In thepresent case, although the payment order correctly identified the benefi-ciary, it referred to a nonexistent account number. Under the clear and
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unambiguous terms of the statute, acceptance of the order could not haveoccurred.”225 Although Llewellyn and the other Legal Realists with whom he workedhad some good arguments for wanting purposive interpretation, theapproach has various difficulties.  One problem is that telling judges thepurpose of provisions is lengthy and cumbersome.226  The drafters of thenumerous revisions to the U.C.C. may have concluded that it is better justto state the rules as simply as possible. Another problem is that giving reasons for rules often creates contro-versy.  People may disagree about the ends to be accomplished.  Forinstance, commentators have debated whether *572 the statute of frauds,or the battle of the forms rule, or even the negotiablity of instrumentsshould continue to exist.227  The drafters of the U.C.C., accordingly, havehad difficulty agreeing on “the purpose” of these rules. Finally, statements of policy can be just as ambiguous at the rulesthemselves.228  For example, section 1-106 instructs courts to administerremedies liberally “to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in asgood a position as if the other party had fully performed.”229  Yet, withoutspecific rules, courts would have difficulty deciding exactly what thisposition would be.230 D. Non-Exclusivity Llewellyn clearly had great ambition.231  He also must have had supremeself-confidence to believe that he could lead an effort to codify and makeuniform a substantial portion of the commercial rules in the United States.No one previously had undertaken a law reform effort even approaching the
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scale of the U.C.C. project.232  Yet, Llewellyn also had a conservative side.Although he favored the creation of the U.C.C., Llewellyn did not want itto serve as the sole source of law on the subjects that it covered. Instead, hewanted the U.C.C. to settle into, and to be supplemented by, a common lawbackground. Section 1-103 concisely captures and expresses Llewellyn’s goal ofmaking the U.C.C. a nonexclusive body of law.  It states: Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this Act, the principlesof law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative tocapacity to contract, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation,duress, coercion, *573 mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating orinvalidating cause shall supplement its provisions.233 This section establishes that the U.C.C. does not attempt to regulate allof commercial law, but merely strives to state some rules.  Background lawfills in all of the gaps. Various commentators have identified the nonexclusivity principle insection 1-103 as one of U.C.C.’s most significant features.  ProfessorsWhite and Summers have characterized the section as “probably the mostimportant single provision in the Code.”234  Grant Gilmore, who served asthe reporter for Article 9, believed that this section distinguished the U.C.C.from civil-law codes, explaining: We shall do better to think of [the U.C.C.] as a big statute--or acollection of statutes bound together in the same book--which goes as faras it goes and no further.  It assumes the continuing existence of a largebody of pre-Code and non-Code law on which it rests for support, which itdisplaces to least possible extent, and without which it could not survive.235The drafters of the U.C.C. had several reasons for wanting to make theU.C.C. nonexclusive.  First, Llewellyn and the other drafters perceived atension between having general legal rules and considering the equities ofparticular cases.236  They believed that section 1-103 provided a solution by
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requiring judges to use all available law to reach just and equitable resultsunless the U.C.C. specifically displaced the pre-existing background law.237Second, the drafters saw theoretical difficulties with attempting to makethe U.C.C. an exclusive body of law.  They did not believe that any statutecould codify completely all of the necessary legal rules and principles.238The official comment*574 to section 1-103 explains that the listing ofvarious supplemental principles “is merely illustrative; no listing could beexhaustive.”239 Third, Llewellyn did not want to “corral” judges.240  As a Legal Realist,Llewellyn admired the ways in which judges had used (and sometimesmanipulated) common law and equitable principles to achieve justice inparticular cases.241  Although he wanted to reform the commercial law, hedid not want to deprive judges of their ability to apply “validating” and“invalidating” causes.242 Llewellyn and his collaborators succeeded in making the U.C.C. anonexclusive body of law.  Article 2, for example, addresses contracts forthe sale of goods.243  The article nevertheless says very little about manybasic contract doctrines. It does not define or require consideration.244  Itdoes not address mistake or frustration of purpose.245  It says nothing aboutconditions or the consequences of their nonoccurrence. 246 Article 2 doesnot attempt to eliminate these doctrines; instead, it merely leaves theirgovernance to the common law, to the principles of equity, and to otherstatutes.247 Article 3, which addresses negotiable instruments, similarly containsmany gaps that the common law must fill.  For example, although Article
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248 See id . §3-305(a) (categorizing defenses that other law might supply). 249 See id. cmt. 1.250 See id . §9-501(1) (stating consequences of a default). 251 See id.252 In some areas, the drafters of the original version of the U.C.C. sought to fillin gaps. For instance, sections 2-703 and 2-711 list the remedies available to thebuyer and seller of goods. See id. §2-703(a)-(f) (allowing the seller to withhold orsuspend delivery, identify goods, recover damages by various measures, or cancel);id. §2-711(1)-(2) (allowing the buyer to cover, collect damages, and resell). Theyappear to present, along with other provisions in the U.C.C., exclusive rules.Likewise, Article 3 states various warranties that a person makes when transferringor presenting a negotiable instrument. See id. §3-416(a)(1)-(5). The article does notcontemplate additional implied warranties associated with negotiable instruments.Still, these few exclusive aspects of various articles did not undermine the generalprinciple of nonexclusivity in the  original U.C.C. 253 SeeU.C.C . §1-102(b), Draft, Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code,Annual Meeting 1997 (visited Oct. 30, 1999) <http:// www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucc1/ucc1.htm> (allowing supplementation by principles of law and equity).254 U.C.C.§5-103 cmt. 2 (1999). 255 Id. art. 8 pref. note, pt. 3(b).
3 indicates when holders of instruments take them subject to defenses, itmostly leaves the definition of the defenses to background law;248  it doesnot state the rules regarding infancy, lack of consideration, mistake, and soforth.249  The original Article 3 similarly said nothing about periods oflimitation, and little about joint and several liability on instruments. Article 9, which covers security interests, provides more examples ofnonexclusivity.  For instance, it gives rights to a *575 secured party toforeclose upon a default.250  The article, however, never specifies whatconstitutes a default.251  Instead, as with the other articles, it leaves thisquestion--and others like it--to background law.252 The drafters of the recent revisions to the U.C.C. have not explicitlyretreated from the principle of nonexclusivity.  The 1997 draft of theproposed new Article 1 has altered the language of the original section1-103 only slightly.253  The official comments to the new version of Article5 state: “Like all of the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,Article 5 is supplemented by Section 1-103 and, through it, by many rulesof statutory and common law.”254  The new Article 8, expressly disavowsattempting to state a “comprehensive code of the law” governing thepurchase of securities or broker-dealer relations.255  Along these same lines,the June 1999 draft of the proposed revision of Article 2 has not attempted
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to capture all of contract law.256  Like the original version, it does notattempt to define or require consideration, discuss capacity to contract, oraddress any number of other basic contract law doctrines.257 Although the U.C.C. continues to rely on supplemental generalprinciples, the drafters of the various revisions have come closer to makingthe U.C.C. the exclusive source of law on various commercial transactions.The best example of this *576 trend appears in Article 4A, which governsfunds transfers.258 The text of the article appears to state all of the rightsand duties of the parties, leaving very little room for supplementation. Theofficial comments, moreover, contain a strong exhortation to courts toexercise caution in supplementing the article. It says: Funds transfers involve competing interests--those of the banks thatprovide funds transfer services and the commercial and financial organiza-tions that use the services, as well as the public interest.  These competinginterests were represented in the drafting process and they were thoroughlyconsidered.  The rules that emerged represent a careful and delicatebalancing of those interests and are intended to be the exclusive means ofdetermining the rights, duties and liabilities of the affected parties in anysituation covered by particular provisions of the Article. Consequently,resort to principles of law or equity outside of Article 4A is not appropriateto create rights, duties and liabilities inconsistent with those stated in thisArticle.259 While this comment does not contradict section 1-103, it does show ashift in attitude.  This provision, moreover, has discouraged courts fromrelying on supplemental general principles.260 
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The new version of Article 9, which will become effective in 2001,261contains a similar comment cautioning judges about employing generalequitable principles to determine priority: Section 1-103 provides that “unless displaced by particular provisionsof this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement itsprovisions.” There may be circumstances in which a secured party’s actionin acquiring a security*577 interest that has priority under this sectionconstitutes conduct that is wrongful under other law. Though the possibilityof such resort to other law may provide an appropriate “escape valve” forcases of egregious conduct, care must be taken to ensure that this does notimpair the certainty and predictability of the priority rules.262 This language probably will discourage courts from invoking supple-mental general principles. In addition, in nearly all of the revisions, the drafters have sought tomake the articles more comprehensive.  In Articles 3 and 4, for example,they have included more definitions.263  They also have added periods oflimitation,264  and explicit provisions on joint and several liability.265Furthermore, they have included specific rules covering subjects that courtspreviously addressed under principles of equity. For example, under thepre-revision version of Article 4, courts sometimes used estoppel to addressissues arising from the misencoding of checks.266  The new section 4-209(a)has a rule specifically dealing with this issue.267 A review of citations confirms that courts are relying increasingly lesson supplemental general principles.  From 1984 through 1988--the fiveyears prior to most of the recent revisions of the U.C.C.--255 cases citedsection 1-103.268  In the past five years, from 1994 to 1998, only 151 cases
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cited section 1-103. 269 Remarkably, in 1998, a mere nine cases cited theprovision.270  With all the revisions that have taken place, the courts haveseen little need to stray from the U.C.C.’s express provisions. At least two factors appear to explain the move from the original goalof nonexclusivity.  First, banks and businesses *578 have taken anincreasingly strong interest in the content of the U.C.C., and have moreinfluence now than in the past.271  They have seen the revision process asan opportunity to resolve important questions about their rights and duties,and have decided that they do not want to leave these questions to uncertainsupplemental general principles that courts might employ.272  For example,during the drafting of Article 4A, banks presumably worried that courtsmight award consequential damages or impose liability for negligence infunds transfers.273 Second, the whole idea of writing an enormous code but leaving manyof the most important issues to supplemental general principles goes againstthe grain of current legal thinking.  Many lawyers and judges have failedto understand that, although the U.C.C. is a long and detailed statute, itdoes not strive to govern all aspects of the subjects that it addresses.Section 1-103, to many attorneys, is simply a mystery.  Accordingly, errorshave occurred, which the drafters have decided to resolve with moreexplicit or detailed rules.  These revisions then reinforce the unintendedview that the U.C.C. strives to be a comprehensive code. E. Compensatory Remedies Karl Llewellyn and his collaborators had a specific policy concerningremedies.  In particular, they sought to implement rules that would focus onmaking the injured party whole.  They desired that judges would lookbackward, envisioning what remedy an aggrieved party would need for
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT38
274 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 T erm--Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 10-12 (1984);Jason S. Johnston, Uncertainty, Chaos, and the Torts Process: An EconomicAnalysis of Form, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 341, 347 (1991); Christopher H. Schroeder,Corrective Justice and Liability for Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 439, 455(1990) (discussing the d ifference between ex ante and  ex post liability rules). 275 See Michael T. Gibson, Reliance Damages in the Law of Sales under Article2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Ariz. St. L.J. 909, 927-28 (1997); DanielW. Matthews, Should the Doctrine of Lost Volume Seller Be Retained? A Responseto Professor Breen, 51 U. Miami L. Rev. 1195, 1210 (1997).276 See U.C.C. §1-102(2)(b) (1999) (stating that the law should permit thecontinued expansion of business practices). 277 See Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the UniformCommercial Code, 1962 U. Ill. L. Forum 321, 330 (1962).278 See K . N. Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush 56-70 (2d ed. 1951). 279 Karl N. Llewellyn, Book Reviews, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 700, 703  (1939).
restoration after a wrong occurred.  They did not concern themselves withthe forward-looking question of how damages might affect behavior in thefuture.  In current terminology, Llewellyn and the *579 other draftersworried about ex post rather than ex ante considerations.274 Although Llewellyn understood that remedies could serve purposesother than making the plaintiff whole, he nevertheless chose that end for theU.C.C.275  Llewellyn believed that people who engage in commercialtransactions should not have to alter their customary practices to meet theneeds of the law.276  On the contrary, the law should reflect actualcommercial behavior as nearly as possible.277  In this respect, Llewellynwas not interested in creating incentives. Rather, he wanted to establishremedies that would correct harms done by people who failed to live up tobusiness standards. In addition, much of Llewellyn’s jurisprudential interest concerned thebehavior of judges.  Llewellyn thought that judges of good faith wouldattempt to do justice in individual cases, one way or another.278 To addressthis reality, Llewellyn wanted to give them statutory authority to act ontheir remedial impulses. Although judges might attempt to take thisapproach in any event, Llewellyn famously quipped that “[c]overt tools arenever reliable tools.”279 Furthermore, as a central tenet of his jurisprudence, Llewellyn believedthat people only had legal rights to the extent that the law provided them
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280 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism--Responding to DeanPound, 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222, 1244 (1931) (“Not only ‘no remedy, no right,’ but‘precisely as much right as remedy’.”). 281 U.C.C. §1-106(1).282 Cours or legislators logically could decide to exclude punitive damages froma field for the purpose of creating incentives. For example, they reasonably mightconclude that business people will be more willing to enter particular commercialtransactions if they do not have to worry about the possibility that a jury later mightimpose a large penalty. Little, if any, evidence, however, supports a hypothesis thatLlewellyn and the other drafters wanted to exclude punitive damages for thepurpose of creating such incentives. On the contrary, the factors cited above suggestthat they did not permit these  kinds of damages because they d id not see them ascompensatory. 
remedies.280  As a result, remedies had to focus on the aggrieved partybecause they ultimately defined that party’s rights. This view of remediesdid not leave much room for considering future incentives. *580 The drafters of the U.C.C. had considerable success in implement-ing their compensatory policy with respect to remedies. Section 1-106(1)declares: The remedies provided by this Act shall be liberally administered to theend that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the otherparty had fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penaldamages may be had except as specifically provided in this Act or by otherrule of law. 281 Notice in reading section 1-106(1) that it focuses on the “aggrievedparty.” The provision seeks to remedy injuries that already have occurred;it does not contemplate that remedies might affect behavior in the future.The end is not to encourage business transactions (perhaps by reducingpotential liability) or to discourage wrongdoing (by increasing liability), butsimply to remedy injuries. The prohibition in section 1-106(1) on special or penal damages isconsistent with the policy of using remedies to compensate victims.  Thedrafters excluded these remedies because they do not remedy injuries thataggrieved parties have suffered.  Instead, these damages serve to punish andthus affect future conduct.  Again, Llewellyn was not interested in creatingincentives, but instead on making injured parties whole.282 In contrast, the restriction on consequential damages at first mightappear to conflict with Llewellyn’s remedial goal. After all, making aninjured plaintiff whole requires compensating the plaintiff for all damage
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283 See U.C.C. §2-511(1) (requiring the buyer to tender payment).284 See id. §3-412 (requiring the maker of note to pay it to the holder accordingto its terms). 285 See 1 Sutherland on Damages § 76, at 228-29 (3d ed. 1903) (“The failure topay a debt when due may disappoint the creditor and embarrass him in his affairsand collateral undertakings; he may consequentially suffer losses for which interestis a very inadequate compensation; but they are remote and do not result alone fromthe default of his debtor. Money, like the staples of commerce, is, in legalcontemplation, always in market and procurable at the lawful rate of interest....”).286 See, e .g. , U.C.C. §2-710 (stating measure of seller’s incidental damages);Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1369 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that the seller may recover certain forms of interest as incidentaldamages). 287 See U .C.C. §§2-712(1), 2-713(1), 2-714(3) (allowing the buyer to collectconsequential damages); id. §2-715(2) (defining buyer’s consequential damages).288 See id . §4-402(b) (consequential damages available for wrongful dishonor);id. §4-403(c) (certain forms of consequential damages available for failure to stoppayments). 
suffered, whether direct or consequential.  Several factors, however,suggest that the general prohibition on consequential damages does notsharply undercut the goal of fully compensating aggrieved parties. First, many commercial lawsuits involve claims that the defendant failedto pay money owed.  For example, the seller of *581 goods may sue thebuyer for not tendering the purchase price,283  or the holder of a negotiableinstrument may sue the maker for dishonoring it.284  The law traditionallyhas embraced the theory that a person should suffer no consequentialdamages by reason of failing to receive a payment of money because he orshe can borrow the money until the courts provide a remedy.285  Althoughthe injured party will have to pay interest for the additional loan, the U.C.C.generally makes this interest recoverable as a form of incidentaldamages.286  The prohibition on consequential damages thus does notinhibit the policy of full compensation in these cases. Second, despite the general prohibition on the recovery of consequentialdamages, the U.C.C. contains many exceptions.  Unlike a seller of goods,the buyer of goods may recover consequential damages.287 Similarly, a bankmay have to pay consequential damages for wrongfully dishonoring a checkor failing to stop payment.288  For the most part, these exceptions ensurethat full compensation occurs. Third, to the extent that the prohibition on consequential damagesactually has any force, it does not necessarily reflect a rejection of
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Llewellyn’s overall remedial goals.  The drafters of the U.C.C. appear tohave been concerned mostly about the difficulty of proving consequentialdamages. 289  They thus saw a practical reason to limit recovery by aplaintiff, even though *582 their theory of remedies suggested the plaintiffshould receive compensation. Llewellyn’s remedial policy has persisted to some extent throughout thenumerous changes and proposed changes to the U.C.C.  The 1997 draft ofthe proposed revision to Article 1 perpetuates section 1-106(1) almostverbatim. 290  Indeed, in a few ways, the drafters of the new versions ofother articles have strived to set damages so that they will accurately reflectactual losses. For example, the revised Articles 3 and 4 have several newprovisions that use comparative fault principles to allocate losses betweena customer and a bank.291 In addition, Article 4 now has a rule that adepository bank which fails to revoke a provisional credit promptly nolonger loses its right to revoke, but instead may revoke after paying thedepositor for any damages caused. 292 The drafters further made explicitthat bank customers may recover consequential damages*583 stemmingfrom the wrongful dishonor of checks.293 In many instances, however, the drafters of the revisions have backedaway from a strict goal of complete compensation.  Instead, they haveconsidered much more carefully how remedies affect behavior.  In thisregard, they have sought to adjust damages to create appropriate incentivesand disincentives.  They have realized that reducing potential liability canencourage desirable business transactions.  They also have recognized thatimposing additional damages may discourage undesirable conduct. In the new section 3-411(b), for instance, the drafters made it possibleto recover consequential damages against a bank that wrongfully dishonorsa cashier’s check, teller’s check, or certified check.294  Although consequen-tial damages conceivably might make the injured party whole, the drafters
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did not justify the rule on these grounds. Instead, they cared about how therecovery would affect the bank’s behavior. The prefatory note to therevised Article 3 specifies that consequential damages will provide“disincentives to wrongful dishonor” 295 by banks. The drafters of the revised version of Article 4A also considered howdamages might affect behavior.  For example, section 4A-305 specificallyrejects the suggestion of an important common law decision, Evra Corp. v.Swiss Bank Corp.,296  that the originator of a payment order might recoverconsequential damages from a bank that failed to execute it or delayed inexecuting it.297  The drafters worried that the possibility of consequentialdamages would make banks reluctant to take payment orders. An officialcomment to section 4A-305 says: The success of the wholesale wire transfer industry has largely beenbased on its ability to effect payment at low cost and great speed.  Both ofthese essential aspects of the modern wire transfer system would beadversely affected by a rule that imposed on banks liability for consequen-tial damages.  A banking industry amicus brief in Evra stated: “Whetherbanks can continue to make EFT [Electronic Funds Transfer] servicesavailable on a widespread basis, by charging reasonable rates, depends onwhether they can do so without incurring unlimited consequential risks.Certainly, no bank would handle for $3.25 a transaction entailing potentialliability in the millions of dollars.”298 The drafters of the revised Article 5 also rewrote its damage provisionsfrom an ex ante perspective.  As in Article 4A, they barred recovery ofconsequential damages because they feared that these damages might makethe price of letters of credit prohibitive.  The prefatory note explains: “Ifconsequential and punitive damages were allowed, the cost of letters ofcredit could rise substantially.”299  The drafters also used remedies todiscourage misconduct. Section 5-111 now requires issuers who wrongfullydishonor or repudiate demands for payment to pay attorney’s fees andlitigation expenses.300  The *584 drafters explained that imposing these
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costs as damages “provides strong incentives for issuers to honor” lettersof credit.301 III. Implications The foregoing discussion attempted to document how Llewellyn’sinfluence on the jurisprudence of the U.C.C. is diminishing.  Many of theoriginal goals that he and others worked to accomplish have faded.  TheU.C.C. now relies more on formalities.  Complete and specific statementsof the law have become more common, with reliance on standards andpurposive interpretation diminishing.  The drafters of the new and revisedarticles have attempted to make them more exclusive, and remediespresently serve purposes other than compensation for loss. What has caused Llewellyn’s imprint to fade?  No doubt it would bedramatic and also intellectually satisfying to identify a single person,interest group, or idea as the impetus for all of the changes in the U.C.C.’sjurisprudence.  This question, however, does not have a simple answer.  Asthe foregoing discussion indicates, many separate revisions have occurred.These revisions have taken place over a period of about dozen years.Numerous individuals, including consumer and business advocates,academics, and government representatives, had their hands in most ofthem.  As result, a wide variety of factors probably brought about thechanges in the U.C.C.’s jurisprudence. One partial hypothesis is that change has occurred because of theconsiderable practical experience with the U.C.C. that has accumulatedover the past fifty years.  Many lawyers and judges have found the U.C.C.difficult to understand.302  Whether correctly or incorrectly, the draftersmay have concluded that purposive interpretation, open-ended standards,the elimination of formalities, and the use of supplemental generalprinciples tend to create confusion. They have opted for what they considermore straightforward ways of expressing the law. *585 Another hypothesis that explains some of the change is that thelaw and economics movement has changed the way many legal scholarsevaluate legal rules. In particular, nearly everyone now thinks morecarefully about how the law can create incentives that will affect behavior.Perhaps for this reason, as noted above, the drafters of the new articles and
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the various revisions have seen that remedies may serve purposes besidescompensation. A third hypothesis is that, in the decades between the original draftingof the U.C.C. and its large-scale revision in the past ten or fifteen years,trust in judges has diminished among the business community.  Theperception of judicial activism in constitutional and statutory interpretationmay have contributed to this feeling.  Whatever the cause, subsequentreformers have not shared Llewellyn’s optimism that judges will strive toreach correct results.  As noted above, banks and industry groups haveplayed a larger role in drafting the law. 303 Unlike Llewellyn, they have seena need to “corral” wayward judges.304 A fourth hypothesis is that Llewellyn’s jurisprudential influence hasfaded to some extent because the textualist school of statutory interpreta-tion has become very influential.  This school emphasizes that judgesshould follow legislative commands as expressed in statutes, and shouldlimit their consideration of other factors.305  To some, principles oftextualism lead to the correlative view that legislatures should takeresponsibility for making the law, and should not delegate the task tojudges.306  Purposive interpretation, open-ended standards, and supplemen-tal general principles do not fit well into this model. Finally, business practices or our knowledge of them may well havechanged in the past fifty years.  Undeniably, the marketplace has becomeless localized and more competitive.  For example, a bank located in onecity may compete with banks in other cities in issuing letters of credit,certificates of deposit, cashier’s checks, wire transfers, and other instru-ments *586 governed by the U.C.C. This competition may lead to calls forclearer rules because each participant wants to know exactly what ispermitted and what is not. Determining the exact causes of the changes, or arguing for or againstwhat has occurred, is simply beyond the scope of this article.  Llewellynand others involved in the U.C.C.’s creation strongly believed in theirpositions.  The revisers of the U.C.C., on the other hand, apparently haveseen reasons for adopting different approaches in many instances.  This
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article makes only the claim that a change in the jurisprudence of theU.C.C. has occurred. The development, nevertheless, has implications that warrant attention.A controversial new idea in a field may, over time, become the prevailingway of thinking.  Yet, after the new idea becomes generally accepted, itmay retain that position only temporarily.  Economics provides a goodexample.  During the 1930s, John Maynard Keynes advocated deficitspending by the government to stimulate the economy.  Although conserva-tives initially opposed the idea, it later gained near-universal support.President Richard Nixon, indeed, famously justified his deficit spending byexclaiming: “We are all Keynesians now.”307  A few decades later,however, monetarism largely has replaced Keynesian theory in currenteconomic thinking. Llewellyn’s fading imprint on the U.C.C. suggests that the samethree-step phenomenon has occurred in the law.  In the 1920s and 1930s,the Legal Realists were expressing new ideas.  In the 1950s, their views hadbecome so widely accepted that Llewellyn could shape the nation’scommercial law with his jurisprudence.  By 1988, echoing Nixon in a muchcited review, Professor Joseph Singer confidently quipped: “We are alllegal realists now.”308  But as this article shows, just ten years later, we arenot all Legal Realists, or at least not in the mold of Karl Llewellyn. *587 If Llewellyn’s theories had remained dominant, then the draftersof the U.C.C. would not be adding formalities and replacing standards withrules. They would not be backing away from purposive interpretation,nonexclusivity, and the policy of using remedies solely for compensation.Perhaps this development suggests that attempting to maintain a singleconsistent jurisprudence in the U.C.C., or any major codification, for a longtime is impossible. Our legal culture probably is too pluralistic for any oneschool of legal thought to dominate an entire field of law for half a century.Llewellyn’s success in at least setting the U.C.C. on its initial jurispruden-tial path may have been the best accomplishment possible. Conclusion 
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This article tells a story of accomplishment and loss.  Karl Llewellynachieved great success in implementing his ideas in the U.C.C.  Yet, asnearly half a century has passed, the U.C.C. has undergone substantialrevision.  The changes have altered not just the substance of the law, butalso its underlying jurisprudence.  Much of Llewellyn’s influence hasdwindled as the drafters of subsequent revisions have rejected or ignoredLlewellyn’s insights from Legal Realism. This development might have saddened Llewellyn, but it probablywould not have surprised him.  In his last book, Jurisprudence, Llewellynobserved that two legal styles have competed with each other throughoutthe history of the nation.309  In the 1830s and 1840s, judges adopted a ratherflexible manner of interpreting the law.310  Between 1885 and 1910,however, a formal style supplanted this mode of judging.311 Starting in the1920s and 1930s, the less formal approach re-emerged, leading to thejurisprudence of the U.C.C. two decades later.312  Llewellyn, I am sure,could foresee that times again would change, and that the formal approachwould regain adherents. *588 Llewellyn’s fading imprint on the jurisprudence of the U.C.C.should influence the law’s future interpretation and revision. As explainedabove, Article 1 presently contains sections that explicitly instruct courtsto engage in purposive interpretation,313  to rely on supplemental generalprinciples,314  and to use remedies to compensate aggrieved parties.315  Asthe nature of the U.C.C. has changed, these sections have becomeinconsistent with the rest of the code. The latest draft of the proposed revision to Article 1 restates Llewellyn’s principles in several sections as though the rest of the U.C.C. hasnot undergone any transformation.316  The drafters should rethink thisdecision because the sections no longer reflect the current character of thecode. To reaffirm them after so much of the U.C.C. has changed has no
KARL LLEWELLYN’S FADING IMPRINT 47justification. Unless the revisers plan to reinvigorate Llewellyn’s ideasthroughout all of the articles, they should redraft or eliminate Article 1provisions that misleadingly would state abandoned objectives as generalprinciples. 
